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IN RE KAISER STEEL CORPORATION: DOES
SECTION 546(e) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
APPLY TO A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
MADE IN THE FORM OF AN LBO
PAYMENT?
I. Introduction
In the 1980's, easy credit and the availability of junk bond financing
created a frenzy of leveraged buyouts ("LBOs").' These LBOs trans-
formed many companies into debt-laden institutions destined to go
bankrupt. When these companies inevitably file for bankruptcy, the
first question is whether creditors should be permitted to sue an origi-
nal stockholder under fraudulent conveyance law to recover the LBO
acquisition payments ("LBO payments") that were made to the origi-
nal stockholder to purchase his stock.2 Assuming creditors can sue
1. A "leveraged buyout" occurs when a group of investors acquires the stock of a
company with borrowed money that is secured by the assets of the company to be
purchased. Ultimately the debt is paid with money generated by the acquired company's
operations or the sale of its assets. The new debt increases the fixed interest cost and
limits the ability of the company to increase debt to survive an economic slowdown. The
risk is that a small decline in operating cash flow will force the company into bankruptcy.
See THE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1990, Table 883 at 534 (1990). See also Benjamin J. Stein, End of an Era? Why the Great
Takeover Frenzy of the Eighties May Have Peaked, BARRON'S, Aug. 28, 1989, at 14.
2. A fraudulent conveyance exists where a debtor makes a transfer before bank-
ruptcy for which he receives less than reasonable equivalent value. The classic example is
the bankrupt farmer who sells his cow to his neighbor for a mere shilling. The remedy
for this injustice is to avoid the transaction and return the cow to the farmer's estate.
A fraudulent conveyance occurs in an LBO if the purchaser uses new debt, secured by
the assets of the company, to purchase the stock of the company and such purchase
leaves the company insolvent or with an unreasonably small capital base. Courts have
held that the purchased stock does not represent adequate consideration because the
stock does not increase the assets available to the creditors. Thus, the proceeds of the
new debt have been squandered and the creditors have been left with a less than adequate
asset base. Therefore, when the company inevitably files for bankruptcy or becomes in-
solvent, the creditors deserve to have these assets returned to the estate. The debtor can
sue to recover the squandered assets under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or alter-
natively if the debtor is not a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, he can sue under state
fraudulent conveyance law. State fraudulent conveyance law is also incorporated in the
Bankruptcy Code under 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1991). See also Kevin J. Liss, Fraudulent Con-
veyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1987); Douglas G. Baird
& Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 829 (1985); Emily L. Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Participants in a Leveraged
Buyout, 72 MINN L. REV. 449 (1988); David G. Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bank-
ruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73 (1985); David A. Murdoch, Linda D. Sartin, & Robert A.
Zadek, Fraudulent Conveyances and Leveraged Buyouts, 43 Bus. LAW. 1 (1987); Alan
Russo, Fraudulent Conveyance Claims in Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
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an original stockholder, the second question is: who is the original
stockholder, the recipient of the LBO payments, the stockholder or
the stockbroker who received the LBO payment on behalf of the
stockholder? More specifically, may the stockbroker be treated as a
mere conduit of the funds, immune from liability?
Although case law has established that the Bankruptcy Code3 per-
mits a debtor to recover LBO payments that constitute fraudulent
conveyances,4 the Tenth Circuit in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc. 5 recently denied a corporate debtor such a recov-
ery from Charles Schwab & Co. The court held that section 546(e) 6
6, 1990, at 1; Michele Galen, Is There Sweet Revenge For Deals That Go Sour?, Bus.
WEEK, March 19, 1990, at 132; Stewart Landefeld, A Guide for the Fraudulent Transfer
Law Maze, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6, 1989, at S6; Donna Walters, Revco Bankruptcy Report
Holds Buyout Parties Liable, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1991, at 4; Kurt Eichenwald, Bank-
ruptcy Court a Threat to Buyout Profits of the 80's, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1991, at Dl; 11
U.S.C § 548 (1989):
Fraudulent transfers and obligations
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or
within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor volunta-
rily or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or
after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obli-
gation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage
in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor
was an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts
that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 548.
4. See Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); Weibolt Stores v. Schotten-
stein, 94 B.R. 488 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); Credit Mgrs. Ass'n. v. Federal Co., 629 F.
Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Gleneagles Investment Co., 565 F. Supp.
556 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, sub nor., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803
F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, sub. nom. McClellan Realty Co. v. United States,
483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Vadnais Lumber Supply v. Byrne, 100 B.R. 127 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1989); In re Anderson Indus., Inc., 55 B.R. 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985).
5. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990).
6. 11 U.S.C. 546(e) (1989) states:
Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(2), and 548(b) of this title, the
trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in section
101(34), 741(5), or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in
section 101(35) or 741(8) of this title, made by or to a commodity broker, for-
ward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or security clearing
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of the Bankruptcy Code protected transfers to stockbrokers made
pursuant to an LBO because such transfers represented "settlement
payments," and were thus exempt from the avoidance power7 of the
bankruptcy trustee.' Congress enacted section 546(e) to protect the
securities markets from the disruptive effects of bankruptcy.9 How-
ever, neither the express language of the Bankruptcy Code nor its leg-
islative history make clear whether an LBO payment is a "settlement
payment" within the meaning of section 546(e). The Kaiser Steel
court broadly interpreted the term "settlement payment" to extend
the protection of section 546(e) to LBO transactions, and thereby ar-
guably unfairly denied recovery to the victims of a fraudulent
conveyance.
This Comment considers whether, in spite of the Kaiser Steel deci-
sion, a bankruptcy trustee should be able to recover a fraudulent con-
veyance made to a stockholder's brokerage account in the form of an
LBO payment. Part I summarizes the Kaiser Steel opinion and ques-
tions the court's interpretation of earlier case law. Part II explains
why an LBO payment to a stockholder's brokerage account should
not qualify as an exempt "settlement payment" under section 546(e)
and thus should be recoverable as a fraudulent conveyance under sec-
tion 548; Part III assumes that such payment is recoverable as a
fraudulent conveyance from the initial transferee1 ° of such payment
and considers whether the initial transferee is the stockholder or the
stockbroker who accepted the payment into the stockholder's ac-
count. The question is whether the stockbroker should be liable as an
initial transferee or whether the stockbroker should be protected as an
innocent conduit of the payment. This Comment concludes that sec-
tion 546(e) should be construed to allow the recovery from a stock-
agency, that is made before the commencement of the case, except under
548(a)(1) of this title.
The 548(a)(1) exception permits the avoidance of intentional fraudulent transfers.
7. According to 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1989), if the bankruptcy trustee avoids a payment
made before bankruptcy, the transaction must be reversed and the payment returned to
be distributed according to the priority of creditors. See infra note 115.
8. Kaiser Steel, 913 F.2d at 848-49.
9. Congress first amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1982; it enacted section 546(e) to
extend the commodities market protections to the securities markets. Section 546(e) lim-
ited the ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid transfers that were margin or settlement
payments to stockbrokers or financial institutions. Congress next amended the Code in
1984 and enacted section 546(f) to specifically extend these protections to the market for
the repurchase of government securities ("the repo market"). See H.R. REP. No. 420,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Recently in 1990, Congress added 546(g) to give specific
protection to the interest rate swaps market. See H.R. REP. No. 484, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) and S. REP. No. 285, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 550.
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holder of a fraudulent conveyance made in the form of an LBO
payment. It also asserts that a bankruptcy trustee, or a debtor in pos-
session, should be permitted to recover an LBO payment from a
stockholder but not from a stockbroker who merely functions as an
innocent conduit in the LBO payment process.
II. Summary of Kaiser Opinion
In 1984, Kaiser Steel Corporation ("Kaiser") entered into a lever-
aged buyout transaction (the "Kaiser LBO")." The Kaiser LBO
commenced with a proxy statement and prospectus that advised
shareholders of the upcoming annual shareholders meeting and the
proposed LBO transaction.' 2 At the meeting, the majority of share-
holders of Kaiser common stock approved the proposed LBO.13 As a
result, all shareholders were required to tender their shares to Kaiser
in exchange for the right to receive for each share $22 in cash and two
shares of preferred stock in the acquiring corporation.' 4
Kaiser subsequently filed for bankruptcy and sued Charles Schwab,
Inc. ("Schwab"), a discount brokerage firm that had accepted LBO
payments in exchange for Kaiser shares owned by its clients. Kaiser,
the debtor, argued that the LBO payments to Schwab should be
avoided as fraudulent conveyances and returned to the creditors.
Kaiser asserted that Schwab was the initial transferee of the LBO
payments.'1
In response to the avoidance suit, Schwab sought summary judg-
ment on two grounds. Schwab claimed that it was not liable because
it was merely a "conduit" through which the LBO payments flowed
and because the LBO payments were "settlement payments" that, by
virtue of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, were not subject to
the trustee's avoidance power.' 6  The bankruptcy court denied
Schwab's motion on both grounds, 17 and the district court reversed on
both grounds.' 8 The circuit court affirmed the district court and held
11. Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs, 110 B.R. 514, 516 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
12. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs, 105 B.R. 639, 643 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) permits recovery from:
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity or the entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
16. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs, 105 B.R. 639, 642-43 (Bankr. D. Colo 1989). The
second ground was introduced by other stockbrokers who joined the pleadings filed by
Schwab.
17. Id. at 650-53.
18. Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs, 110 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
[Vol. XIX
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that the LBO payments were "settlement payments" under section
546(e). The circuit court, however, failed to address the conduit
issue. 19
The bankruptcy court held that the LBO payments were not ex-
empt as settlement payments to a stockbroker because the payments
were not made in the ordinary course of the stockbroker's business,
i.e. the settlement of ordinary purchases and sales of stock. 20 From
the legislative history, the court determined that Congress intended to
restrict the meaning of "settlement payments" to include only those
payments made in the ordinary course of business.2 The ordinary
course of business of a stockbroker is to settle buy or sell orders for
shares of stock in the open market. The court further held that, ac-
cording to agency law, the stockbroker was liable as the initial trans-
feree of the payment.2 2 According to agency law, an agent is immune
from contract liability only if the contracting party had knowlege of
the agency status and the identity of the principal.23 Because the
stock was held by Schwab in a street name, the purchaser had no
knowledge of the principals who were the actual owners of the stock.
The district court, reversing the decision of the bankruptcy court,
held that the LBO payments should be considered settlement pay-
ments because the Bankruptcy Code's definition included "any simi-
lar payment commonly used in the securities trade."' 24 The court
interpreted this phrase to give the term "settlement payment" "a rea-
sonably flexible meaning with reference to industry practice. ' 25 The
court cited Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgt. Corp. v. Spencer
Sav. & Loan Ass'n.26 and Blanton v. Prudential-Bache Securities,
Inc. 27 to support its flexible interpretation. The district court rejected
the bankruptcy court's agency analysis of the transferee issue. Instead
it followed the case law exempting mere conduits from transferee lia-
bility and held that the stockbroker was such a conduit.28
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Kaiser court addressed whether
the LBO payments were "settlement payments" under section 546(e).
19. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (loth Cir. 1990).
20. Kaiser Steel, 105 B.R. at 651.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 649-50.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 321 (1958).
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (1989).
25. Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs, 110 B.R. 514, 522 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
26. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgt. Corp. v. Spencer Say. & Loan Assoc., 878
F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1989).
27. Blanton v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 105 B.R. 321 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1989).
28. Kaiser Steel, 110 B.R. at 518.
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The court held that the LBO payments were settlement payments and
thus not recoverable because settlement payments are exempt from
avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance under section 548. The court
looked to the definitions referenced in section 546(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code2 9 and concluded that the referenced sections, sections
101(35) and 741(8), did not provide a clear definition of "settlement
payment." Because these Bankruptcy Code definitions are circular
and relatively ambiguous, the court turned to the case law and legisla-
tive comments to determine the intended meaning of the term "settle-
ment payment."'30
Few courts have attempted to interpret section 741(8). In Kaiser,
the Tenth Circuit looked to In re Bevill aI and In re Blanton 32 to sup-
port an "extremely broad" 33 definition of "settlement payment" that
was not limited to settlements in the ordinary course of business.34
The court justified its reliance on these cases because it claimed that a
broad interpretation was "consistent with the legislative intent behind
section 546 to protect the nation's financial markets from the instabil-
ity caused by the reversal of settled securities transactions. '3' The
court also noted that its decision to treat LBO payments as settlement
payments was consistent with the securities industry's definition of
"settlement payment."3 6
The Kaiser decision unfairly relied on the persuasive authority of
29. Section 101(35) of the 1990 Bankruptcy Code states:
"settlement payment" means, for purposes of the forward contract provisions of
this title, a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an
interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement
payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the forward contract
trade.
Section 741(8) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
"settlement payment" means a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settle-
ment payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on ac-
count, a final settlement payment, or any other similar payment commonly used
in the securities trade.
30. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1990).
31. Bevill, 878 F.2d at 751.
32. Blanton, 105 B.R. at 347.
33. Id.; Bevill, 878 F.2d at 751.
34. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 848-49 (10th Cir.
1990).
35. Id. (citing Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs, 110 B.R. 514, 522 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990)).
36. Securities industry defines "settlement" to be "[t]he completion of a transaction,
wherein securities and corresponding funds are delivered and credited to the appropriate
accounts," NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LANGAUGE OF INVESTING GLOSSARY 30
(1981). The SEC took the position in Kaiser that the consumation of an LBO is a settle-
ment payment. Kaiser Steel Corp. v Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 849-50 (10th
Cir. 1990).
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the In re Blanton and In re Bevill decisions. These cases involved
different markets and different sections of the Bankruptcy Code. The
next section will summarize these decisions, distinguish them, and ex-
plain why their broad interpretation of "settlement payment" should
not apply to LBO payments in the equity securities market.
A. Summary of Blanton
In re Blanton involved margin payments of a Prudential-Bache em-
ployee, Blanton, used to cover the currency options that he sold.
Blanton used leverage to sell put and call options on the Swiss franc.
The options created a band of volatility within which he would make
money.37 If the franc traded above or below the band, he would liqui-
37. Blanton, 105 B.R. at 326-27. An option is a contract that gives its holder the right
to buy or sell an asset at some predetermined price within a specified period of time. To
understand how options work, suppose an investor owns 100 Swiss francs which on April
11, 1985 sell for 65 dollars. The investor could sell someone else the right to buy his 100
Swiss francs at any time during the next three months for a price of 70 cents per franc.
The 70 cent price is called the excercise or striking price. This type of option is referred
to as a call option. The seller of the option is defined as an option writer. An investor
who sells a call option against Swiss francs in his portfolio is said to be selling a covered
option. Options sold without the francs to back them up are called naked options. For
example suppose an investor sells 3 month naked call options for 100 francs at 70 cents a
franc. If the price of a franc reaches 80 cents per franc and the option is excercised, the
writer must cover his position to pay the option holder. The writer is forced to buy 100
francs on the open market for 800 dollars and and then sell the 100 francs to the option
holder for 70 cents per franc or 700 dollars, resulting in a 100 dollar loss.
A speculator could also sell someone the right to sell Swiss francs at a specified price at
any time in the next three months. This type of option is called a put option. Suppose
you sell a 3 month put option on 100 Swiss francs at a strike price of 60 cents per franc.
If the market price for francs decreases to 50 cents per dollar and the put option is ex-
cercised, the writer of the option must buy 100 Swiss francs for 600 dollars and then sell
them on the open market for 500 dollars, taking a loss of 100 dollars.
A straddle results when an investor buys put and call currency options to profit on an
increase or decrease in price of a currency above or below the two strike prices. If an
investor feels that the price of a currency will remain between the band created by the.
upper and lower strike price, he can sell both put and call options. If at the end of the
option period the market price of the currency has not gone above or below the band, he
will profit by the amount of the sale price of the options. An investor who has sold put
and call options to create a band can limit his losses by rolling over his position. He rolls
his position by covering his losing position and selling more put and call options to create
a new band below or above the original band depending on the direction of the loss. For
example, if he sells a put option to strike at 60 and a call option to strike at 70 and the
market value of the currency changes from 65 to 55, he will sell new puts at 50 and calls
at 60 to help pay for the loss on his original put options. This system helps to control the
negative effects of increased volatility but is disastrous in the face of a long term steady
decline or rise of a currency.
FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANK ZARB, HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: SECURI-
TIES, OPTIONS, FUTURES 545-59 (1981); EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, FUNDAMENTALS OF FI-
NANCIAL MANAGEMENT 533-39 (1986); Ira G. Kawaller, Options on Currency Futures,
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date his losing position and cover his losses with the proceeds from
the sale of more options above and below the new franc value.38 In
January of 1987, a continuous fall in the value of the U.S. dollar
against the Swiss franc created margin calls that Blanton could not
cover. In response to the uncovered margin calls, Prudential-Bache
liquidated Blanton's option positions at a substantial margin account
deficit.39 Blanton could not cover this deficit and consequently filed
for bankruptcy.'
Blanton sued Prudential-Bache to recover his margin payments as
preferences.41 Prudential-Bache argued that the margin payments
were protected under section 546(e).42 The court held that all of the
payments were essentially margin payments, except for one payment
that was a "settlement payment." This payment was intended to
compensate Prudential-Bache for its expenditures associated with
closing out Blanton's positions.43 To close out Blanton's positions,
Prudential-Bache had used its own funds to purchase options voiding
those sold by Blanton. Because Blanton's payment was not used to
cover funds borrowed on margin, the margin payment was atypical.
To avoid explaining why the payment should be considered a margin
payment, the court stated that the terms "margin" and "settlement
payment" were "very broadly defined by the Bankruptcy Code."'
Thus, the court held that the payment should be treated as a settle-
ment payment under section 546(e).45 The court focused its discus-
sion on the definition of "margin payment" 46 and neglected to
consider the legislative history associated with the term "settlement
payment."
B. Summary of Bevill
The second case upon which the Kaiser court relied, In re Bevill,
involved the transfer of federal government securities pursuant to a
repo agreement. 47 In Bevill, the purchaser entered into a "hold-in-
THE BANKER'S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1987, at 20-22; Robert A. Feldman, Foreign Currency
Options, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Dec. 1985, at 38-41.
38. Blanton, 105 B.R. at 326-27.
39. Id. at 323.
40. Id. at 323.
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1989). Trustee may avoid payments made to specific credi-
tors on or within 90 days before the filing of the petition for bankruptcy.
42. Id. at 345.
43. Id. at 346.
44. Id. at 347.
45. Id. at 347-48.
46. Id. at 347-48.
47. Bevill, 878 F.2d at 752. A standard repo agreement consists of two contempora-
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custody" repo agreement whereby the seller retained possession of the
securities. Several weeks after entering into the repo agreement, the
seller transferred the securities to the purchaser. Within 90 days of
this agreement, the seller filed for Chapter 11 reorganization, and the
purchasers liquidated the securities. The Chapter 11 bankruptcy
trustee sought to avoid the prepetition deliveries of securities to the
purchasers as preferences and fraudulent conveyances.4"
The Third Circuit in Bevill held that section 546(f) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code bars a Chapter 11 trustee from utilizing sections 547 and
548 to recover securities or their proceeds from a repo participant.49
Section 546(f) resembles section 546(e); however, section 546(f)
was enacted in 1984, two years after section 546(e), and applies to
settlement payments made to repo participants.5" The circuit court
interpreted section 546(f) to define broadly the term "settlement pay-
ment."'" The court held that the transfer of the securities was in-
cluded in the wide array of accepted settlement procedures for repos
and, therefore, should be exempt from avoidance in accordance with
the policies behind section 546(f).
The circuit court recognized the flexible and varied settlement prac-
tices in the repo market for government securities. 52 The court de-
scribed three traditional repo methods of delivery: a "deliver-out"
repo, a "tripartite" repo, and a "hold-in-custody" repo. A "deliver-
out repo" provides for the securities to be delivered to the purchaser
neous transactions. First, the seller (usually the dealer) will transfer the securities to the
purchaser in exchange for cash. Second, the seller will agree to repurchase the securities
at a future date for the original price plus a cost of money increment. See Dan Kovlak,
What You Should Know About Repos, 67 MGM'r. AccT. 52 (1986); Jerome I. Baron,
Problems and Solutions with Repurchase Agreements, 4 INT'L FIN. REV. 17 (1985);
Steven A. Lumpkin, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements, 73 ECON. REV.,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 15 (1987); Elizabeth M. Osenton, The Need
for a Uniform Classification of Repurchase Agreements: Reconciling Investor Protection
with Economic Reality, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 669 (1987); Gary Walters, Repurchase Agree-
ments and the Bankruptcy Code: The Need for Legislative Action, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
828 (1984); William F. Hagerty, Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty Over the Repo Markets:
Characterizations of Repos as Separate Purchases and Sales of Securities, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 1129 (1983).
48. Bevill, 878 F.2d at 744.
49. Id. at 743.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 546(f) (1989):
Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a) (2), and 548(b) of this title, the
trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in section
741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section
741(8) of this title, made by or to a repo participant, in connection with a repur-
chase agreement and that is made before the commencement of the case, except
under section 548(a)(1) of this title.
51. Bevill, 878 F.2d at 751.
52. Id. at 746.
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or his designated custodial bank. A "tripartite" repo requires delivery
to a third party, usually a custodial bank, which holds the securities
for the benefit of both parties. A "hold-in-custody" repo allows the
dealer to retain control of the securities as long as the dealer identifies
them on his own books as securities subject to specific repo transac-
tions. Some broker-dealers will pay a higher repo rate if the buyer
does not require that the securities be physically delivered or trans-
ferred over the wire. 53
In Bevill, the circuit court held that the transfer of the securities
from the seller to the purchaser was the conversion from a "hold-in-
custody" repo to a more traditional "deliver-out" repo and that,
therefore, because the transfer of securities was designed to effect this
conversion, it was an accepted method of "settlement payment." 54
The court stated that section 741(8) of the 1982 amendments to the
Code broadly defined "settlement payment" and, consequently, "the
district court did not interpret 'settlement payment' in accordance
[with] the realities of the repo market or in accordance with congres-
sional intent."" The court held that the "settlement payment" en-
compassed all transfers that were traditionally part of the settlement
process, regardless of the date on which the transfers occurred.56
The court justified its broad interpretation of "settlement pay-
ment" by citing the public policy behind section 546(f). The court
first examined the policy behind section 546(e), the 1982 amendment
which served as the model for 546(f). The public purpose of section
546(e) was to prevent "the insolvency of one commodity or security
firm from spreading to other firms and possibly threatening the col-
lapse of the affected market."" In enacting the section, Congress de-
sired to protect the market from the devastating ramifications of a
"ripple effect." '5
8
53. Id. (citing Br. for Appellant Niagra County Savings Bank, citing The Use of Re-
purchase Agreements by Broker-Dealers, SEC DIRECTORATE OF ECONOMIC AND POLICY
ANALYSIS 18 (Dec. 1987)).
54. Bevill, 878 F.2d at 744.
55. Id. at 751. The Bevill district court focused on the definition of "settlement pay-
ment" in the context of corporate securities transactions between a stockholder and a
customer. Because securities trades customarily settle within five business days of execu-
tion, the court concluded that "settlement payment" refers to a transaction that is con-
summated within five days of the agreement to purchase. The Bevill district court held
that the payment was not a settlement payment because the delivery occurred outside the
traditional five day settlement period. Id. at 750.
56. Id. at 752.
57. Id. at 747 (citing H.R. REP. No. 420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982)).
58. Id.
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After the 1982 amendments were in effect, In re Lombard- Wall5 9
alerted Congress that the amendments did not "adequately protect
liquidations of repos in the event of the insolvency of a dealer or other
participant in the repo market."' In response, Congress passed the
1984 amendments, including the addition of sections 362(b)(7),
546(f), and 559, authorizing repo participants to liquidate their secur-
ities and keep the proceeds to the extent of their contract price.6' The
1984 amendments manifested Congress' increased concern for main-
taining the efficiency and stability of the repo market. The Bevill
court acknowledged Congress' intent to give specific protection to the
repo market and therefore interpreted the term "settlement payment"
broadly to reflect this intent.
III. The Term "Settlement Payment" Should Have Been
Interpreted Narrowly In Connection With The Equity
Securities Market
The Tenth Circuit in Kaiser relied on both In re Blanton and In re
Bevill to extend a broad definition of "settlement payment" to the eq-
uity securities markets. The Kaiser court should not have applied
such a broad definition of the term "settlement payment" to the eq-
uity securities market. First, the broad definitions of "settlement pay-
ment" used in Blanton and Bevill do not apply to the equity securities
market because Blanton focuses on transactions that are margin pay-
ments, and Bevill formulates a definition reflecting Congress' specific
intent to protect the repo market. Second, Congress intended that the
term "settlement payment" would encompass only payments made in
the ordinary course of business.62 LBO payments, however, are not
ordinary payments. Third, justice and public policy mandate a more
59. Lombard-Wall Inc. v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co. (In re Lombard-Wall Inc.),
No. 82 B 11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
60. Bevill, 878 F.2d at 747 (citing the 1983 Senate report at 47). In the Lombard-
Wall case, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
holder of securities subject to a repurchase agreement was subject to the automatic stay
provision of the Bankruptcy Code and could not close out its position with the debtor
without the court's approval. The case manifested the risks to the repo market created by
the Code's automatic stay and avoidance provisions and the inability of the 1982 amend-
ments to fully protect the repo market from the bankruptcy of market participants.
Hearings conducted by the House of Representatives demonstrated that under the Lom-
bard- Wall holding the repo participant would be subjected "both to the unexpected in-
ability to liquidate securities it holds and to the risk of capital loss should unfavorable
interest rate changes occur; these risks impair the qualities that are the essence of the
appeal of repo agreements." Id.
61. 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(f), 559.
62. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 391-92 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. See also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 546.05, at 546-24 (1990).
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narrow interpretation of "settlement payment," an interpretation that
does not permit stockholders to retain windfall profits at the expense
of innocent creditors.
A. The Blanton and Bevill Definitions Do Not Apply to the
Equity Securities Market
In analyzing a statute, a court should not be guided by a single
sentence or phrase of a sentence, but should look to the provisions,
objectives, and policy of the law.63 According to Justice Holmes, "A
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which it is used."" As Justice
Traynor said, we need "literate, not literal" judges.65 Thus, the defini-
tion of "settlement payment" in section 546(e) should reflect the con-
gressional intent to protect the stability of the equity securities
market.66 The repo market is a completely different securities market;
its purpose and importance are separate and apart from that of the
equity securities market.
The broad definitions of "settlement payment" employed by the
courts in Blanton and Bevill are inappropriate for the equity securities
market. The Blanton court molded the term to avoid classifying a
payment as a margin payment. 67 The case essentially involved a mar-
gin payment and the market for currency options. Moreover, the case
focused on the term "margin payment" in section 546(e) and failed to
mention the legislative history of the term "settlement payment."
The specific interpretation of "settlement payment" in the context of
margin payments on currency options should not be applied to LBO
payments in the equity securities market.
The Bevill court's definition of "settlement payment" also is simi-
larly inappropriate for the equity securities market. The Bevill court
interpreted the term "settlement payment" in the context of section
546(f), a section specifically designed to protect the repo market.
Thus, the Bevill interpretation reflected a market whose size and in-
terdependent nature requires a higher degree of protection. 6 The
repo market in government securities is a huge market that serves
several vital roles in the nation's economy. The repo market facilitates
63. Bevill, 878 F.2d at 750.
64. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
65. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 749 (1970).
66. See supra note 57.
67. Blanton, 105 B.R. at 347-48.
68. See supra note 36.
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the auction of government securities, helps the federal reserve to con-
trol the money supply, and enhances the liquidity of mortgage-backed
securities.69
The United States Treasury relies heavily on the repo market to
finance the national debt at the lowest possible cost.70 New issues of
Treasury debt securities initially are offered to approximately thirty-
six primary dealers at auction.7 I The primary dealers themselves lack
the funds required for the outright purchase of these securities. Con-
sequently, the dealers need financing and traditionally have relied on
repo transactions with secondary dealers to provide the lowest cost of
financing. 72 Secondary dealers, in turn, finance their purchases by
selling the securities under repos to institutional customers." Banks
may be able to provide the necessary financing, but the cost of bank
debt would be greater and would result in lower bids at auction. An
inefficient repo market would translate into higher interest rates for
government securities.74
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve has used the repo market as an
effective short-term mechanism for the implementation of monetary
policy.75 The Federal Reserve makes extensive use of repos in regu-
lating the level of bank reserves. 76 To smooth unexpected fluctuations
of the monetary supply, the Federal Reserve engages in repo transac-
tions as a seller, to decrease bank reserves, and as a buyer, to increase
bank reserves.77 Constant monetary supply is important to prevent
fluctuations in short-term interest rates and the rate of inflation.78
During 1985, the Federal Reserve entered the repo market over 150
times, and Federal Reserve operations in the market on a single day
often reached three to four billion dollars and as high as seven billion
dollars.79
Finally, the repo market contributes to a strong housing market by
enhancing the liquidity of mortgage-backed securities that are insured
69. Bevill, 67 B.R. at 567.
70. Id. at 567 (citing Sternlight, the Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Aff, 7, at 4).
71. Id. See WILLIAM B. HARRISON, MONEY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THE
ECONOMY (1985).
72. Id.
73. Blanton, 67 B.R. at 567; Bevill, 878 F.2d at 746.
74. Bevill, 67 B.R. at 567 (citing Goldman Rep. at 9).
75. Id. See HARRISON, supra note 71.
76. Bevill, 67 B.R. at 567-68.
77. Id. at 567-68.
78. HARRISON, supra note 71.
79. Bevill, 67 B.R. at 568 (citing Sternlight, the Executive Vice President of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York, AfT. $ 4, at 3).
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by government sponsored agencies such as GNMA and FNMA8".
Thus, disruption of the repo market would result in higher repo rates
and, hence, higher home mortgage rates."'
Because of the importance of the repo market to the economy, Con-
gress concluded that:
The effective functioning of the repo market can only be assured if
repo investors will be protected against open-ended market loss
arising from the insolvency of a dealer or other counter-party in
the repo market. The repo market is as complex as it is crucial. It
is built on transactions that are highly interrelated. A collapse of
one institution involved in repo transactions could start a chain
reaction, putting at risk hundreds of billions of dollars and threat-
ening the solvency of many additional institutions.8 2
Because the repo market offers short-term liquidity and low risk of
capital loss, it operates at rates similar to those of government securi-
ties. If the repo market were disrupted by bankruptcy legislation, the
rates would be controlled by the credit of the participant and only
AAA 83 participants could operate efficiently.84  Furthermore, the
highly interdependent nature of the repo market suggests that a dis-
ruption of the market could lead to a financial crisis.8 5
The equity securities market, in contrast, is much smaller and plays
a less fundamental role in the national economy. Although the aver-
age daily repo volume is several hundred billion dollars, 6 the daily
volume of the New York Stock Exchange for 1988 was approximately
five billion dollars.8 7 Even after the market crash on October 17,
1987, the record volume of the New York Stock Exchange was only
75 billion dollars for the entire week ending October 23.88 Because
the stock market is smaller and not as interdependent as the repo
market, the stock market can survive disruptions more easily with
80. Id. The federal government has established three major organizations to
purchase mortgage securities from the financial institutions that originally made the
loans. The three organizations are the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA),
the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). These organizations purchase loans, guarrantee them,
and then sell them to the secondary markets. The government guarantee permits the
mortgages to trade in the secondary markets at yields only slightly higher than U.S.
Treasury bonds.
81. Id. (citing Goldman Report at 12).
82. S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, at 47 (1983).
83. AAA is Standard & Poor's highest credit rating.
84. See supra note 36.
85. Id.
86. FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, Table 1.43, at A32 (June 1990).
87. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 6 (1990).
88. Id. at 5-6.
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fewer negative effects.8 9 In contrast to the repo market, the primary
role of the stock market is to provide liquidity to market
participants.9
The equity market thrives on risk.91 Collateral does not exist, and
in the event of bankruptcy, the equity investor usually loses his entire
investment. Unlike investors in the repo market, who seek short-term
liquidity and low risk of capital loss, investors in the equity markets
acknowledge the risks involved and invest primarily for long-term
profits.92
If courts permitted the avoidance of fraudulent stock buyouts, the
equity markets would not be affected significantly. The value of po-
tential takeover stocks would fall to reflect the new risk associated
with LBOs.93 Although equity investors would be forced to pay back
fraudulent LBO payments, such payments would represent only a mi-
nor portion of investor funds and would not affect demand in the mar-
ket.94 Moreover, avoidance would not create a ripple effect because
the Securities and Exchange Commission carefully regulates lever-
aged securities investing and because the liabilities incurred by inves-
tors would be minor in comparison to the diversified portfolios of the
investors. 95
Because the equity market is smaller, less interdependent, and not
as closely linked to the framework of the national economy as the
repo market, the avoidance of stock buyout payments would not sig-
nificantly disrupt the routine business of the market or undermine the
public policy to protect the market.
B. The Intent of Congress Demands a Narrow Interpretation
Congress intended the term "settlement payment" in section 546(e)
of the Bankruptcy Code to refer only to payments in the ordinary
course of business in the securities market. 96 Congress' restrictive in-
89. RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
(1988).
90. Id.; Anonymous, Don't Wait for the Stock Market To Cure Itself, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 1988 at A26 (letter to the editor).
91. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 89, at 149-50.
92. Id. at 149-68. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET
MECHANISMS 11-12 (1988).
93. BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 89, at 125-68.
94. See supra note 4.
95. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 89, at 125-68; REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 11-12 (1988).
96. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 391-92 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787: "Subsection (c) insulates variation margin payments and other de-
posits from the avoiding powers except to the extent of actual fraud under section
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tent originated from section 764(c).
Congress enacted section 546(e) in 1982 to replace section 764(c),
which applied only to commodity brokers. Section 764(c) was en-
acted in reaction to Seligson v. New York Produce Exchange,97 which
held that a trustee could recover a margin payment made to a com-
modities clearing house. The court's decision in Seligson protected
margin payments from the avoiding powers of the trustee except in
cases of actual fraud under Bankruptcy Code section 548(a)(1).9s
Congress intended section 764(c) to protect only transactions made in
"the ordinary course of business in the market." 99 In 1982, Congress
repealed section 764(c) and incorporated it into 546(e) to "clarify and,
in some instances broaden the commodities market protections and
expressly extend similar protections to the securities markets. ' ' l°
Congress' intention in doing so was "to minimize the displacement
caused in the commodities and securities markets in the event of a
major bankruptcy affecting those industries."' 10 1
Collier's Bankruptcy Treatise maintains that section 546(e) did not
expand the underlying provisions of former section 764(c). 102 Rather,
Collier claims that Congress intended to retain the qualification that a
transaction be in the ordinary course of business in the market. Thus,
Cong'ress did not intend to protect the special event of the settlement
of a tender offer for stock.103
The Bevill court recognized Congress' intent to restrict the meaning
of "settlement payment" to the ordinary course of business. The
Bevill court's broad definition of "settlement payment" expanded the
meaning to encompass various acceptable settlement methods com-
monly used in the market. However, the Bevill court did not expand
the definition to include transactions outside of the ordinary course of
business. 104
The purpose of section 546(e) is to protect the market from the
destabilizing effects of bankruptcy. 05 The stability of the market does
not depend upon the treatment of unusual settlement payments that
548(a)(1). This facilitates prepetition transfers and protects the ordinary course of busi-
ness in the market." See also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 546.05, at 546-24 (1990).
97. Seligson v. New York Produce Exchange, 394 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
98. Id.
99. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 391-92 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787.
100. H.R. REP. No. 420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
101. Id. at 1.
102. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 546.05, at 546-24 (1990).
103. Id.
104. Bevill, 878 F.2d at 752.
105. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir.
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occur outside of the ordinary course of a stockbroker's business. 10 6
LBO payments are not routine settlement payments made in the ordi-
nary course of business; they are special and unusual payments differ-
ent from routine stock trades. 0 7 In the LBO in Kaiser, all shares were
mandatorily tendered according to a merger agreement that had been
approved by a majority of the stockholders. 0 8 After the buyout, the
shares were no longer publicly traded.1 0°9 The transactions were not
individual trades, but were the result of a corporate dictate that com-
pelled the sale of an entire class of shares. Congress intended to pro-
tect trading in the market and did not intend to protect the organized
selling of an entire class of stock in accordance with a merger
agreement. 1o
Even if, hypothetically, merger transactions were considered rou-
tine transactions in the ordinary course of business, certainly a large-
scale merger that is so leveraged that it constitutes a fraudulent con-
veyance would not constitute a routine and ordinary transaction.
Congress never envisioned allowing a windfall profit to sharehold-
ers that received fraudulent conveyances in the form of LBO pay-
ments ("fraudulent LBO payments")."' Although large LBOs were
open and notorious in the 1980's, Congress failed to mention LBO
transactions either at the time of the enactment of section 546(e) in
1982 or at the time of the enactment of the 1984 repo amendments 12
and the 1990 swap amendment. 1 3 Because Congress acted to extend
specific protection to repo participants, Congress demonstrated that it
would provide specific legislation to protect transactions not expressly
protected by the 1982 amendments. 1 4 Congress did not create an
amendment to protect LBO settlement payments; thus, it did not in-
tend to protect them.
1990) (citing Kaiser Steel Resources v. Jacobs, 110 B.R. 514, 522 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
See supra notes 53 & 54.
106. See supra note 52. If the payments are unusual, they will not affect the usual
routine payments which constitute the day to day transactions of the market.
107. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs, 105 B.R. 639, 652 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989).
108. Id. at 643.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 52.
111. See supra note 52. Although actual fraud by the selling stockholders prevents the
application of section 546(e), stockholders would rarely be in a position to know the
fraudulent intent of the purchaser unless they were in a position close to the company
such as an officer or board member of the company. The proxy statement will not pro-
vide enough information to make the selling stockholders intentionally fraudulent.
112. See supra notes 52 & 53; H.R. REP. No. 420, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 546(g) (1990).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 546(f). See H.R. Rep. No. 484, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. REP.
No. 285, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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C. Justice and Public Policy Warrant a Narrow Interpretation
In the interest of justice and the public policy behind section 546(e),
LBO payments should not be exempt from the avoiding powers of the
trustee. The avoidance of LBO payments would prevent stockholders
from enjoying the illicit rewards of fraudulent transfers and would
cause stockholders to consider tender offers more carefully and reject
offers likely to invite bankruptcy. The negative effects of permitting
avoidance are insignificant. Avoidance would not cause a major dis-
ruption or financial collapse of the equity securities market; rather,
avoidance would transfer the risk of bankruptcy from the credit mar-
kets to the equity market, where participants could control the risk of
bankruptcy by voting against highly leveraged tender offers. Avoid-
ance would deter LBOs, the purpose of which is not to operate a
leveraged company effectively, but to gamble with creditors'
money."1 5 If courts permitted avoidance, public policy would be
served because stockholders would vote against such fraudulently
structured LBOs.
Although protecting fraudulent LBO payments may increase the
stability of equity securities markets, it simultaneously may decrease
the stability in debt markets. While the equity seller need not con-
sider the risk that his sale will be avoided in the event of a fraudulent
conveyance determination, the debt holder must contemplate the pos-
sibility that an LBO involving the fraudulent conveyance will occur
and thus cause the value of his debt securities to deteriorate. Thus,
the issue presented is who should lose the value of his investment, the
shareholder who voted for the fraudulent buyout or the innocent
bondholder whose trust was violated. In the interest of justice, the
trustee on behalf of the bondholders should be permitted to recover
the fraudulent payments made to stockholders.
115. To facilitate a fraudulent LBO, a raider borrows against the assets of the target
company and uses the proceeds of the new debt to buy the company from the stockhold-
ers. The raider then owns 100% of the equity of a highly leveraged company. If the
company has a record year and can increase operating earnings above and beyond the
increased interest cost, the raider will make a fortune. If, however, the company has a
good, but not exceptional, year, the company will go bankrupt and the bondholders will
not be paid in full. Because the raider bought the original shareholders' stock with the
debt of the company find probably only a small amount of his own capital, he loses al-
most nothing. The result is that under 546(e), after the company files for bankruptcy, the
creditors cannot recover the assets that have been fraudulently conveyed to the previous
stockholders simply because the buyout payments were paid through a stockbroker. See
supra note 1.
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IV. Result: Broker should be Treated as Conduit
If a court disagrees with the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Kai-
ser, it may hold that the LBO payment to the broker is not protected
as a settlement payment under section 546(e). If the payment is not
protected, the bankruptcy trustee can avoid the LBO payment and
seek repayment from the initial transferee of the fraudulent transfer
under section 5 50(a). 16 The question of Whether the initial transferee
is the stockbroker or the stockholder arises. Whether the broker
should be considered the initial transferee, an agent for the initial
transferee, or simply a "mere conduit," immune from liability, must
be addressed. The broker should be treated as an innocent conduit,
and the shareholders should be held liable as initial transferees.
Many brokers use security clearinghouses to enable them to trans-
fer and pledge securities on behalf of their customers by means of
computerized bookkeeping records without physically transferring
the securities.' 17 As a participant, brokerage houses register their cus-
tomers' securities in a nominee name or, "street name," to facilitate
transfers. In Kaiser, Schwab used the Depository Trust Company
("DTC") to effect the redemption of its customers' stock and regis-
tered its customers' stock in the name of Schwab & Co." 8s Although
the broker was the physical transferee of the payment for the stock,
and the stock was registered in the name of the broker, the broker was
only an agent for its customers and could not be treated as a pure
transferee.' The broker, however, could be classified as either the
agent for the owner of the stock or as a conduit of the funds.'
The bankruptcy court in Kaiser held that the broker was an agent
116. Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the trustee's recovery of a fraudu-
lent conveyance. This section provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is
avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee
may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so
orders, the value of such property, from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such trans-
fer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate'transferee of such initial transferee.
(b) The trustee may not recover under subsection (a)(2) of this section from-
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present
or antecedent debt in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer
avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.
117. Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs, 110 B.R. 514, 516 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
118. Id. at 517.
119. Id. at 519-21.
120. Id. at 521.
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for the stockholder and, therefore, was liable under agency law. 12'
The court asserted that conduit law did not apply where a direct con-
tractual relationship between the debtor and the defendant existed. 22
The court stated that "the strict application of agency law requires
knowledge of the identity of the principals and not just the fact of the
agency.' 23 Thus Schwab's agency status could be a defense only if
the purchaser of the stock knew that Schwab was an agent and knew
the identities of the principals. The court concluded that, because
Kaiser's records showed that the stock was registered in the broker's
name, Kaiser had a contract with the broker.' 2' The court claimed
that the injustice to Schwab could be avoided by Schwab as agent
recovering from its principals, the customers. 25 Unfortunately, the
transaction costs associated with recovering from a class of buyout
recipients are extensive and would impose a significant liability on the
broker. 126
The district court rejected the bankruptcy court's reliance on
agency law and reversed the decision. The district court held that the
broker was a conduit. 27 It reasoned that the lower court incorrectly
assumed that Kaiser's records indicated Schwab as the record owner
of the stock when, in fact, the records revealed that the stock was
registered in DTC's street name, "Cede & Co." Furthermore, the
court stated that the agency analogy assumed a contract between Kai-
ser and Schwab; however, the court concluded that no contractual
relationship existed. 28
The decision in Kaiser should not have been based on the street
name in which the securities were registered because a broker could
use a non-identifiable street name to escape liability. Moreover, the
contract that existed was the merger agreement between Kaiser Steel
Corporation and KAC, the acquiring corporation. The stockholders,
including Schwab as agent for its customers, approved this merger
agreement and therefore, were parties to that contract. Nevertheless,
121. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs, 105 B.R. 639, 649-50 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989). If a
party enters into a contract in his own name and receives the benefit of that contract in
his own name, he is liable for any obligations arising out of that contract even if he is not
acting for his own account but is acting for the account of some undisclosed principal. Id.
122. Id. at 648.
123. Id. at 650.
124. Id. at 649-50.
125. Id. at 650.
126. Final Report of Examiner, Professor Barry L. Zaretsky, In re Revco D.S. (1990),
at 237.
127. Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v, Jacobs, 110 B.R. 514, 519-21 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990).
128. Id. at 523.
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the term "transferee" should be interpreted in terms of conduit theory
to avoid the unjust consequences of agency law. Stockbrokers who
merely accept funds on behalf of their customers should be treated as
conduits.
Courts have interpreted section 550(a)(1) to qualify certain initial
transferees as conduits who are immune from liability. The court in
the seminal case, In re Fabric Buys, 29 found that a law firm was not
liable as an "initial transferee" for the funds that it received from the
opposing party to settle a dispute with its client. 130 The court held
that the law firm acted as a mere conduit of funds from Fabric Buys
to its client. 131 It stated that an "initial transferee" is one who deals
directly with the debtor 32 and concluded that the lawyer was not a
transferee simply because payments were funneled through an escrow
account in his charge. 33 The court further held that, even if the law
firm were deemed to be the initial transferee, its power of equitable
discretion could be exercised to prevent the trustee from recovering
the payment from the law firm. 34
The first district court case to apply conduit theory was In re Co-
lombian Coffee Co.' 35 In Colombian Coffee, the trustee of the debtor
sought to recover from a bank, funds that were fraudulently trans-
ferred to the bank for deposit into a second corporation's account.
The court followed the decision in In re Fabric Buys and applied the
conduit theory.' 36 The court cited Judge Cardozo's discussion of ini-
tial transferee liability: "the person to be charged with liability, if he
has parted before the bankruptcy with title and possession, must have
been more than a mere custodian, an intermediary or conduit between
the bankrupt and the creditor."' 137
129. Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys), 33 B.R. 334 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983).
130. Id. at 336-37.
131. Id. at 337.
132. Id. (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 550.01, at 550-3 (15th ed. 1983)).
133. Id.
134. The Fabric Buys court cited COLLIER:
In some circumstances, a literal application of section 550(a) would permit the
Trustee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing and deserves
protection. In such circumstances the bankruptcy court should exercise its dis-
cretion to use its equitable powers under section 105(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1481 to
prevent an inequitable result.
Id. at 337.
135. Metsch v. First Alabama Bank of Mobile (In re Colombian Coffee, Inc.), 75 B.R.
177 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
136. Id. at 178.
137. Id. (citing Carson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 254 N.Y. 218, 235-36, 172 N.E. 475,
482 (1930)).
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The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in Bonded Financial Serv-
ices, Inc. v. European American Bank. 3 ' The court introduced the
"dominion and control" test to determine transferee status.1 39 In
Bonded Financial Services, a bank received a check payable to the
bank's order with a note directing the bank to deposit the money into
their client's account. After this transaction the client instructed the
bank to debit the account to pay down one of his outstanding loans
from the bank. The court defined "dominion and control" as the
right to put money to one's own purposes and concluded that the
bank was not liable as an initial transferee because the bank did not
have dominion and control over the money."
More recently, the Eleventh Circuit extended the "dominion and
control" test in In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.' In this case, a bank-
ruptcy trustee sought to recover funds wired to a bank that were used
to pay down a one day overdraft.' 42 The bank permitted the overdraft
to facilitate the payment out of the account of funds which the bank
had confirmed were to be wired into the account the next day. The
court held that the overdraft did not create a debtor-creditor relation-
ship and was insufficient to establish the bank's control over the
money.' 43 The court stated that the control test "requires courts to
step back and evaluate a transaction in its entirety to make sure that
their conclusions are logical and equitable."' It further found that
"courts have refused to allow trustees to recover property from de-
fendants who simply held the property as agents or conduits for one
of the real parties to the transaction.' ' 45
If a court objectively evaluates the role of a broker that accepts an
LBO payment on behalf of its customer, it should conclude that the
broker has no beneficial interest in the payment and is clearly "not
more than a mere custodian, intermediary or conduit" between the
parties.' 46 The broker does not have the right to use the payment for
its own purposes and thus, does not have the "dominion or control"
138. Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. European American Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th
Cir. 1988).
139. Id. at 893.
140. Id.
141. Nordberg v. Societe Generale (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 848 F.2d 1196
(lth Cir. 1988).
142. Id. at 1198. To pay down an overdraft means to deposit money to an account
that has a negative balance.
143. Id. at 1200-02.
144. Id. at 1199.
145. Id. at 1199-1200.
146. Carson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 254 N.Y. 218, 235-36, 172 N.E. 475, 482 (1930).
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XIX
IN RE KAISER STEEL
necessary to be considered a transferee.' 47 A stockbroker who acts as
an intermediary for payments to his customers is an innocent conduit
that should be immune from liability as a transferee.
V. Conclusion
The Kaiser court misinterpreted section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy
Code and unjustly protected stockholders who had received leveraged
buyout payments constituting fraudulent conveyances. The court
confused the intent of Congress and incorrectly relied on cases inap-
plicable to the equity securities market. As a result, contrary to pub-
lic policy, the Kaiser decision permitted stockholders to retain
windfall profits at the expense of innocent creditors.
Other circuits should reconsider the Kaiser opinion. Section 546(e)
should not protect a fraudulent conveyance in the form of an LBO
payment. Instead, courts should permit the bankruptcy trustee to
avoid such payments as fraudulent conveyances and recover such
payments from the stockholders. Courts should not permit the
trustee to recover from a stockbroker who as an innocent conduit
does not qualify as a transferee. This interpretation of section 546(e)
prevents stockholders from enjoying the proceeds of fraudulent con-
veyances, protects stockbrokers who are innocent conduits, and per-
mits creditors to recover their rightful assets.
William C. Rand
147. See Nordberg v. Societe Generale, 848 F.2d 1196 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
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